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Abstract
Recently, Treasury Secretary Larry Summers implied that the government would be de creasing the supply of
government bonds in order to pay down outstanding debt. This likely represents the beginning of President
Clinton's plan to use a surplus that could total as much as $1.92 trillion over the next ten years to begin to
eliminate the national debt (Dreazen, 2000).
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Government Debt
By Jeremy Sandford
I.  INTRODUCTION
Recently, Treasury Secretary Larry Summersimplied that the government would be decreasing the supply of government bonds in
order to pay down outstanding debt.  This likely rep-
resents the beginning of President Clinton's plan to
use a surplus that could total as much as $1.92 trillion
over the next ten years to begin to eliminate the na-
tional debt (Dreazen, 2000).  The wave of prosperity
that has spread over the United States throughout the
last decade has left the government with additional
tax revenue.  However, there is considerable debate
over just what to do with it.  Now in the second fiscal
year with a small surplus, Washington politicians are
trying to decide among three ways to utilize the sur-
plus revenue.  The most popular option among politi-
cians and voters alike seems to be reducing and even-
tually eliminating the national debt.  However, a legiti-
mate argument can be made that the surplus is a re-
sult of increased tax revenue and should therefore be
returned to the people in a tax cut.  Also rather press-
ing are the impending Social Security and Medicare
crises.  There is little doubt that neither of these pro-
grams will be around long enough to help today's chil-
dren if dramatic action is not taken.  Much has been
made of the possibility of using surplus funds to some-
how "save" these programs.  So which of these three
options would be the most effective use of the
government's extra revenue?
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
There is a good deal of support among econo-
mists for using the entire surplus to pay down the na-
tional debt.  Of the surplus, Alan Greenspan said, "The
first priority, in my judgment, should be getting the
debt down” (Greenwald, 1999).  The government
does pay some $200 billion annually in interest, much
of which could be eliminated by paying off the debt,
resulting in large savings (Congressional Budget Of-
fice, 2000).  Some argue that there are likely benefits
to paying down the debt, such as lower interest rates.
There also seem to be many economists who simply
see it as the logical thing to do; the government has
extra revenue, it has debt, the extra revenue should
pay off the debt.  Indeed,  paying down the debt seems
to be the preferred use of surplus revenue by politi-
cians with incumbents and candidates of both major
parties promising to pay off the debt in varying time
spans.
Logical as it may seem, is there any real advan-
tage to using the first surpluses in years to reduce debt?
Our debt is not especially likely to grow anytime soon,
but our economy is definitely growing.  As debt stays
constant and GDP rises relatively quickly, the ratio of
debt to GDP goes down every year, thus effectively
lowering the debt burden (Kudlow and Moore,
1999).  The debt/GDP ratio is soon expected to go
down to pre WWII levels (Kosterlitz, 1999).  With
interest rates being relatively low, the holding cost of
debt is small (Kudlow and Moore, 1999).  James
Grant (2000), editor of the Grant Interest Rate Ob-
server, says that there is no clear correlation between
debt and interest rates and that debt level is not a
significant enough determinant of interest rates to
warrant worrying about it.  Moreover, paying off the
public debt completely by buying back all treasury
bonds would rob the government of their prime
method of monetary policy and deprive citizens of
one of the most stable and secure forms of invest-
ment (Kosterlitz, 1999).  Many economists also seem
to be of the opinion that talking about paying off the
debt is futile as congress cannot be trusted to watch
money pass by them without spending it on some-
thing.  As Kudlow and Moore said, "Congress will
spend the money, because to do so is in its nature”
(Kudlow and Moore, 1999).
One economist notes that there is nothing inher-
ently noble about debt elimination.  Individuals and
companies routinely rely on debt for survival, and
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rarely see the elimination of all debt as a top priority.
After all, if you have a mortgage on a house that is in
a wretched state of disrepair, you would obviously
use what money you could come up with to repair the
house, not to pay off the mortgage (Anonymous,
1999a).  It is easy to argue that the government's
position is analogous.  Social security and Medicare
will both be crippled by the baby boom generation
reaching old age if nothing is done first.  Assuming
these programs are worth continuing, it makes more
economic sense to shore up these programs then to
pay down the debt.  One idea, which has been imple-
mented by many European countries already, is to
continue to mandate social security payments but to
give individuals some control over how to invest the
money they pay into the fund.  This "privatization"
would initially require large cash outlays (as the pro-
grams would no longer be transfer payments, but
would have individuals pay for their own retirement
by investing), but would eventually hugely reduce gov-
ernment costs and FICA taxes, while raising the
amount available to retirees (Greenwald, 1999).  If
such a program were ever actually implemented, it
could make Social Security and Medicare both sol-
vent and much more efficient in the long run.
The other option available to policymakers
would be to return the excess money to where it came
from: the taxpayers.  The surplus is the result of higher
tax revenues coming from increased income from the
prolonged economic boom.  The share of the GDP
that is taken up by taxes, now 20.7%, is the highest it
has been in the postwar era (Anonymous, 1999b).
Moreover, taxes are currently increasing faster than
GDP, which constitutes an effective tax increase.  such
an increase would be patently unnecessary given the
current state of the economy (Evans, 1999).  A tax
decrease would, perhaps most importantly, stimulate
growth and expand the economy even further.  This is
especially beneficial because if the economy expands,
the debt to GDP ratio mentioned earlier will continue
to decrease, thus decreasing the significance of the
national debt without paying it down (Anonymous,
1999c).  Also, some economists think that the future
health of Social Security and Medicare are much more
dependant on the size and growth of the economy,
not on the debt level (Anonymous, 1999c).  As Moore
and Kudlow (1999) said, "A dollar devoted to re-
ducing marginal tax rates or the tax penalty against
saving and investment will yield a higher return to the
American economy, and thus to future generations,
than a dollar used for retiring debt."
In summary, it would be nice to pay off the na-
tional debt, but there are strong arguments among
economists that surplus money would be better spent
privatizing Social Security and fixing Medicare or cut-
ting taxes in order to stimulate growth.  These pro-
grams would expand the economy, lessen the impor-
tance of the national debt and better enable the nation
to cope with Social Security and Medicare problems
of the future.
III.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The national debt of the Unites States was a
healthy 26% of GDP in 1980.  By 1997, the debt
skyrocketed up to about 50% of GDP (Elmendorf
and Mankiw, 1998).  Forty years of cold war military
spending and eight years of Reaganomics took their
toll on the country's fiscal situation.  In fact, the spike
in the debt during this period was similar in magnitude
to the spikes that occurred during World War I and
the Great Depression (see Figure 1).  Yet obviously
the politicians who made this debt possible knew what
they were doing.  Five trillion dollar debts don't hap-
pen by accident.  Could it be true that government
debt doesn't really hurt anyone as much as it appears
to?  Indeed, there is some disagreement among econo-
mists on how bad debt is for a country.  There is even
one significant school of thought that says that debt
finance and tax finance are equivalent.  So maybe
debt doesn't really hurt anyone after all.  However,
the empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggest that
although taking on debt can expand the economy in
the short-run, it crowds out capital, reduces invest-
ment, and increases the trade deficit in the long run.
Of course, the most pernicious effect of reduced in-
vestment is reduced output, which is the ultimate ef-
fect of debt.
Our current debt is undoubtedly the result of
the military spending cold war deficits and the Reagan
tax cuts of the early 80's, which, despite increasing
short-run output and possibly staving off a recession,
left the US with a gigantic debt that is currently about
five trillion dollars.  Now, the country is faced with an
aging population and rising medical costs, which could
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cripple the Social Security and Medicare programs.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the
government will have to increase non-interest spend-
ing by 5% of output by 2025 to meet increased health-
care needs (Congressional Budget Office, 1997).  This
may mean more debt financing.  Bottom line, the cur-
rent levels of taxing and spending in the United States
are unsustainable for very long.
The effect of debt that seems most unfair and
most frustrating is that debt financing amounts to little
more than borrowing from future generations.  Cur-
rent deficits invariably mean that tax revenue must be
increased in the future.  When President Reagan cut
taxes and took on debt to pay for it, he was essen-
tially taking money from future generations to give to
his electorate.  Thus, whichever generation actually
pays down our current debt will be different than the
generation that enjoyed the benefits the debt brought.
Some economists subscribe to a theory called
Ricardian Equivalence, which is the idea that debt and
tax finance are equivalent.  Ricardian Equivalence is
based on the tenet that taking on debt today will re-
quire higher taxes in the future.  It assumes that people
realize this and therefore save more so that they or
their children will be able to pay the higher taxes in
the future.  Thus, a decrease in public savings will be
exactly offset by an equivalent increase in private sav-
ings.  Debt financed tax cuts and government spend-
ing increases merely rearrange income and savings
between the government and its citizens.  However,
Ricardian Equivalence has been hard to test because
it renders some fiscal policies irrelevant while allow-
ing others (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1998).  The con-
ventional view on debt, subscribed to by a majority
of economists, does not believe that people are for-
ward-looking enough to increase their savings in or-
der to pay for future taxes.  If people are given money,
they will spend it, regardless of what will happen far
into the future.  Although Ricardian Equivalence is not
generally thought to describe reality, it is useful as a
stepping-stone for more realistic discussion, and to
illustrate the idea that the income generated by debt is
taken from future generations.
Given that private savings is not believed to
rise by the same amount that public savings falls, it
then becomes clear that increased deficits lead to
decreased investment.  National income is equal to
consumption, private savings, and taxes (the private
sector's budget constraint).  Income is also equal to
consumption, investment, government spending, and
net exports combined.  So, we have:
Y = C + S + T
Y = C + I + G + NX
Combining the two equations yields:
S + (T - G) = I + NX
By definition, net exports must equal net foreign
investment, investment in other countries by domestic
residents less domestic investment by foreigners.  So:
S + (T - G) = I + NFI
This is an identity, meaning it is always true.  If
the government takes on a deficit, the term (T - G)
decreases.  The conventional view holds that private
savings S will not go up by as much, so I and NFI
must decrease (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1998).
The decline in NFI must, by definition, be met
by an equivalent decline in NX.  The term "twin defi-
cits" was coined in the 1980's to refer to the phenom-
enon of trade deficits following budget deficits
(Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1998).  Significant trade
deficits lead to an increase in the value of the cur-
rency, which makes US goods more expensive rela-
tive to foreign goods, thus decreasing their attractive-
ness and further augmenting the already increased
trade deficit.
The far more significant consequence of the iden-
tity given above is that investment must decrease.
Decreased investment will result in a smaller capital
stock, which, according to the Solow model, is the
key determinant of output in the long run.  Thus, even
if debt financed tax cuts or government spending in-
crease output in the short run, in the long run, invest-
ment will be decreased and output will decline.  Ad-
ditionally, with less capital available, the marginal prod-
uct of capital (MPK) will be higher.  A higher MPK
will result in a higher return being earned on each unit
of capital and thus a higher interest rate.  So, in the
long run, debt drives up the interest rate and decreases
capital stock and, in turn, income.
The above analysis only takes into account new
debt, which would represent a change in the term (T
- G) and thus a change in the terms I and NFI.  How-
ever, the US's accumulated debt is still stifling income
even though we now run surpluses, which President
Clinton predicted would increase investment by 1%
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per year for the next 50 years (Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers, 1994).  The point is, regardless of
what happens with the budget deficit or surplus in
coming years, as long as we have a debt, our income
is lower than it could be.  Why?  Debt takes money
away from capital projects.  When people loan money
to the government, it is not used to purchase capital,
as it would be if it were loaned to a company, but to
finance tax cuts or government spending programs.
Debt, therefore, can be said to crowd out capital.
The full effects of this aspect of debt can be under-
stood very easily by looking at Mankiw's Parable of
the Debt Fairy.  Suppose that there is a debt fairy, a
close relative to the tooth fairy, who likes to travel
around the country replacing government debt with
capital stock.  One night, the debt fairy gets excited
and travels all over the economy and ends up replac-
ing every government bond with a piece of capital of
equivalent value.  Citizens are surprised to wake up
to discover computers and manufacturing equipment
on their dressers and in their safe deposit boxes where
they formerly had treasury bonds, but realizing that
their new capital goods have equal values, they don't
mind too much.  The new equipment is put to work,
and the capital stock is increased overnight by the
amount of government debt (Elmendorf and Mankiw,
1998).  Mankiw calculates the effect of this capital
stock increase by estimating the gross MPK to be
about 6%.1 Thus, each dollar of debt turned into capital
increases national income by six cents.  In the US,
debt is currently about half of output, or about $5
trillion.  If the capital stock were increased by this
amount, net output would increase by about 3%, or
about $300 billion.  Mankiw concludes after a lengthy
analysis that this is a reasonably good estimate of the
effects of government debt on our economy.
IV.  CONCLUSION
So, what are the effects of government debt
on the US economy?  The current debt has lowered
output by 3-4%.  Labor productivity grows at about
1% per year, so this deficit is roughly equivalent to a
loss of three or four years of productive growth
(Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1998).  This is unfortunate,
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but not a disaster.  Yet as the US stands on the cusp
of its social security crisis, it is important for such ef-
fects to be noted before relying on debt financing as
the panacea for any social or economic problem.
The Congressional Budget Office estimated
that, under current law, the aging population and in-
flating medical costs mentioned earlier will require the
government to increase its spending by 5% of output
by 2025 (Congressional Budget Office, 1997).  If
the current debt were maintained, all other things be-
ing equal, it would then represent about 1/3 of na-
tional income.  Eliminating that debt would then add
about 2% to national income, or 40% of the addi-
tional spending needed (Elmendorf and Mankiw,
1998).  Although eliminating the debt by then seems
unlikely, the fact that not having a debt would bring
the US so much closer to solving its social security
problems should serve as a sound warning against
excessive debt financing.  Indeed, it is unfair to ask
current generations of wage earners to pay for the
excesses of their parents by paying off the debt in its
entirety.  A gradual paying down, starting as soon as
possible, will spread the burden across generations
and lessen the short-run contractionary effect on the
economy.  Debt can be a short run solution and a
useful fiscal policy aid, but sustained deficits have a
strongly detrimental effect on the economy.
FOOTNOTES
1MPK equals the capital share of income
(MPK*K/Y) divided by the capital-output ratio (K/
Y).  Mankiw estimated that between 1960 and 1994,
gross return to capital was roughly 1/3 of income,
and the capital-output ratio was a little over 3.  Thus,
gross MPK is about 9.5%.  If depreciation was about
3.5% of capital, then net MPK is about 6%.
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